From a Long Telegram to the Fall of the Wall

I just finished doing studying for the Cold War section of my foreign policy test. I missed the two class periods we talked about it, so I did a little extra research, and asides from learning that my professor took part of her power point presentation right off of a Wikipedia page, I found some rather interesting information from all the speeches and national security reports I read.
First of all, my generation really has no idea what life was like in the days of the Cold War. JFK's strategy included what is called Assured Destruction. This was a message sent to the USSR that if they ever ordered a nuclear attack on the States, we would still be able to retaliate with enough nuclear firepower to blow 50% of their industry and 25% of their population (50 million+) into the next life. The threat of nuclear warfare occurring in our own backyard was real like kids today have never known. The man who started it all--George Kennan, who wrote a telegram from Moscow in in 1946 cluing in America to what was going on in the Kremlin. His precise words, "If the adversary (of the USSR) has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns." In short, they aren't going to mess with a bigger dog, which advice drove up military spending, enlargement and engagement for years to come.
Kennan also gave some great advice for the American people in this telegram, namely that they remain calm and do not become emotionally unsettled, that they learn about the adversary, and that they cling to the values of society that we hold dear in America. Unfortunately the education most people received about the USSR actually turned out to be government-fed anti-communist propoganda that scared the crap out of people.
In the telegram he wrote, "It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own." Kennan argued that many countries feel that security needs trumped the need of freedom and that thay could be wooed by the guidance Soviet offered unless the United States stepped in before them. This plan to intervene in order to contain the influence of the USSR came to define the overarching strategy of foreign policy over the next 40 years. The next year in an article titled The Sources of Soviet Conduct Kennan advised "a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon he interests of a peaceful and stable world." Looking back in history, we see that the United States did just that in places like Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan.
While battles and bloodshed occurred in these places, the Cold War was not about military influence, it was about political influence. Since the fall of the Soviet Union things have changed. Recent miltary campaigns the US has entered in have been humanitarian missions and based on the global war on terror. These wars have, in general, been met with disapproval from the public (Somalia, Haiti, Operation Iraqi Freedom), but imagine if they were part of the strategy of containment. The villains are the same, just not ones of global influence, which is a big turn-off for most people. But when you throw in the right propoganda, the wars become a lot more palatable to the American public. If we had feared Sadaam Hussain as much as communism no would care how long we stayed there to construct the new regime. Unfortunately the Bush administration couldn't paint that picture--the real foe existed in a man named Osama Bin Laden (who doesn't lead a state against which one can really wage war). Thanks to the SALT and ABM argreements that happened late in the Cold War the world is a safer place, and it's harder to strike as much fear into the American public as it was during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
By no means do I disagree with Kennan, but I'm not sure everybody understood him. The arms race was a waste of time. Once Kennedy issued his Assured Destruction policy, we had really hit critical mass. Neither side could really justify further arming themselves, so by the time Nixon got around, he realized it was a waste and put an end to the race with the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty. We are lucky enough to live in a day when the threat of a nuclear armagedden is far from the forefront of anyone's mind. Containing the influence of the USSR through proxy wars was absolutely necessary to show them that we were committed to the cause and that they wouldn't be able to push around any larger nations without a formidable opposition. And just as Kennan said, the Soviets were driven back by force.
It's hard to say what exactly would have happened had the US approached the Soviet Union any other way. I can't honestly say I think the USSR would have fallen if not for a constant adversary, which would be why China has seen so much success with their totalitarian communist regime--they haven't had a consistant aggressor. Which brings up another question - if China really does surpass the US as the global superpower, will we have lost the Cold War? China broke relations with the USSR in the early 70s, but they still are a totalitarian government guilty of human rights violations and denying their own citizens freedoms we take for granted in the States. If that time comes, it's possible we will once again find ourselves asking, "Who lost China?" but that is a discussion for another time